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Abstract: A number of studies concluded that family ownership structure 
increased firm’s performance and also firm value. However, the benefit of 
family ownership will elapse when the opportunity to expropriate minority 
exists (Jiang and Peng, 2011). According to Claessen et al. (2000), higher 
entrenchment occurred in Indonesia, together with Philippines and Thailand. 
As of 16.6% of Indonesia’s public companies was controlled by family as a 
single majority shareholder, on the other hand, the low law enforcement and the 
lowest corruption index are another fact in Indonesia. In such a condition it is 
expected that family ownership has a negative impact on firm value. Using big 
capitalisation public companies listed in Indonesia Stock Exchange (IDX) as a 
research sample, this study supports the hypothesis that there is a negative 
impact of family ownership on firm value, at the significance level of 10%. 
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1 Introduction 
Family ownership structure has become as one of the interested topics to be studied, 
particularly its effects on firm value. Villalonga and Amit (2006), Maury (2006), Jiang 
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and Peng (2011), Barontini and Caprio (2006), Anderson and Reeb (2003) and Claessen 
et al. (2000) are some of the researcher that actively studied this topic. Villalonga and 
Amit (2006) examined whether family ownership, control and management, influence 
firm value. By using the company’s data-Fortune-500 companies, during the years 1994 
to 2000, Villalonga and Amit (2006) found that family ownership creates added value if 
the founder acts as the CEO or the Chairman of the Board of Commissioners with CEOs 
recruited from outside. 
Maury (2006) conducted a study to examine how the performance of a company 
controlled by the family (family-control) compared with companies that are not 
controlled by the family in 1,672 non-financial companies in the region of  
Western Europe. The study objective was to confirm the existence of control by the 
family, whether the performance of the family control better than non-family control, 
given the diversity of the various results of previous studies. The results showed that 
family-controlled companies is positively associated with higher performance than 
companies that are not controlled by the family. 
Jiang and Peng (2011) observed whether the family ownership and control  
play an important role in major companies in Asia, since there is still a puzzle  
regarding the association between the family ownership concentration and control on the 
one hand and performance on the other, whether good, bad or not related. The study was 
conducted on 744 large public companies in eight Asian countries. The study was 
designed in two studies, study I and study II. The study II is study I added with a variable 
level of investor protection. The results of the study I showed that the  
existence of the family as the CEO is positively related to performance, supported by two 
countries, i.e., Indonesian and Taiwan. The study II exhibited that the presence of the 
family as the CEO is positively associated with performance in the countries with low 
level of investor protection. Further, the existence of pyramid ownership on the  
contrary, was positively related to performance in countries with high levels of investor 
protection as supported by Hong Kong, Malaysia and Singapore, except Indonesia and 
South Korea. 
This result enhanced the previous research and provided better explanation on the 
diversity of the research related to whether family ownership contributes benefits to the 
performance of the company. This study successfully demonstrated that the supremacy of 
law in each country as shown by the level of investor protection is the useful factor to 
distinguish the presence or absence of a family control to the company’s performance. It 
also entailed that the state is not always neutral in the relationship between family 
ownership and performance. 
Barontini and Lorenzo (2006) searched 675 companies in eleven countries of 
Continental Europe. The purpose of the study was to investigate the association of 
ownership structure, firm value and performance. The study indicated that family 
ownership structures did not decrease firm value and performance. The existence of 
company’s founder control and the presence of descendant in the board of director were 
significantly affect firm value and performance. However, if the descendant as CEO, the 
company’s value and performance were not different from non-family corporate 
ownership. The results are in line with the findings of several previous studies that family 
ownership is positively related to the performance and firm value. However, care should 
be taken in interpreting these results due to several factors that have not been  
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anticipated in the test, such as the level of investor protection as conducted by  
Jiang and Peng (2011). 
Anderson and Reeb (2003) examined the relationship between the family as the 
founding family, ownership and corporate performance in the 403 companies included in 
the S&P 500, for period 1992 to 1999. The results denoted that the performance of firms 
with founding family firm is much better than with non-founding family firm. Based on 
further analysis, it was found that the relationship between the founding family firm 
performance is nonlinear, family CEO has better performance as compared to non-family 
CEO. Overall these results reject the agency hypothesis, in other words, family 
ownership is an effective ownership structure. 
On the other hand, Demsetz (1983) argues differently, that concentration of 
ownership is the result of a decision to maximise the profit made by the shareholders  
at this time, therefore there is no effect on firm value. Some research supports  
Demsetz and Lehn (1985), Himmelberg et al. (1999) and Demsetz and Villonga (2001). 
Claessens et al. (2000), specifically stated that Indonesia is a country with concentrated 
ownership, 16.6% of the total listed companies as a public company controlled by the 
family as a sole proprietor. Meanwhile, Jiang and Peng (2011) said that the level of rule 
of law in Indonesia is relatively low at 3.98 and has the lowest corruption index among 
the countries in the East Asia region, i.e., 2.15, implied that the level of investor 
protection is very weak. In such condition, the family ownership has a big opportunities 
to expropriate minority shareholders. 
It is therefore interesting to study further in the context of Indonesia, where the level 
of investor protection is weak and corrupt, to prove allegations that family ownership 
does not have a positive impact on firm value due to agency conflicts between owners 
actually exist, the latter, this study once wanted to confirm the results research (Jiang and 
Peng, 2011), that in Indonesia, the presence of family ownership negatively affect 
performance. 
2 Theoretical review and hypotheses development 
2.1 Family ownership 
The definition of family firm or family ownership is very broad, and is different from 
research to research. Neubauer and Lank (1998) tried to construct the development 
concept of family firm from 1975 to 1988, to identify aspects that exist in the family firm, 
which are controlled by the family, founded by the owners expected later replaced by its 
successor, the family members will share in the company profit, important decisions and 
succession planning are influenced by family members and relatives have legal control 
over the company (Casillas et al., 2007). While Villalonga and Amit (2006) stated that 
family firm as a company extensively owned by family, including 
1 one or more family members are as a company’s director or board of directors or a 
majority shareholder 
2 a company that at least one of its members on the board of commissioners or 
management 
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3 the company’s largest voting rights or number of shares owned by the largest 
families 
4 the company’s second generation of one or more family members are as 
management or directors, and so on. 
Similar to the Villalonga and Amit (2006) and Casillas et al. (2007), characterise some 
aspects that are categorised as a family enterprise, namely ownership or control of the 
company, the family of power beyond the power company, the intention to carry on 
business to the next generation and involve the next generation in the company. 
Family firms have advantages compared with non-family companies, firstly, family 
firm can overcome the agency problem between owners and management. Berle and 
Mean (1932) and Fama and Jensen (1983) supports that the presence of family ownership 
will overcome agency conflict between owners and management, due to the owner has an 
interest to oversee management to ensure management actions that do not conflict with 
the interests of owners. Secondly, family firm concern to keep family name, lead the 
company to act conservatively. Therefore, family firm will tend to avoid to be overly 
aggressive that can severely damaged family reputation (Harris et al., 2004). Moreover, 
the family firm is more emphasis on the sustainability of the family enterprise than 
simply maximising profitability or increase the market price of the securities 
(Athanassiou et al., 2002). 
On the other hand, a tight family ownership may create agency problems between 
majority shareholders and minority shareholders (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). 
Additionally, Sort et al. (2009) found that the family firm has three dimensions of 
entrepreneurial orientation lower than non-family firms in terms of autonomy, 
proactiveness and risk taking. Although Sort et al. (2009) did not succeed in proving that 
the level of aggressiveness in competing and innovativeness different with non-family 
companies. 
2.2 Family ownership in the context of Indonesia 
Indonesia is one of the developing countries in the South East Asia, developing a small 
scale entrepreneurs and characterised by labour-intensive industry. Government shall 
provide assistance in the form of training, facilities and subsidies to business groups that 
uniquely grouped into centres of business based on the similarity of economic sectors and 
geographical areas (Dana, 2007). Furthermore, Dana (2007) explains that historically, 
Indonesian style in the old entrepreneur usually has more than one accounting, one for 
personal, one for the shareholders and another one for taxes. Although the next 
generation has a more open western education with western management style, but 
corruption remains ongoing in the future. Corruption is common in business and 
government. 
Currently, according to the study of Jiang and Peng (2011), it has confirmed that 
Indonesia has been recorded as a country with the lowest position of corruption index 
among other countries in the East Asia region, i.e., 2.15 and also has a low level  
of law enforcement, i.e., 3.98. On the other hand, Claessens et al. (2000) uncovered  
that Indonesia is a country with concentrated ownership, in which 16.6% of  
the public companies controlled by the family as a sole proprietor. In such condition, 
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therefore, there is a great opportunity for the controlled family to expropriate the 
minority. 
In the Indonesian context, the ownership of the family actually increase the risk of 
expropriation of the minority shareholders or known as the agency conflict II. It was due 
to the law environment that remain unconducive. Eventhough by the enactment of  
Law 40 of 2007, the rights of minority shareholders has indeed been accommodated, but 
these rights do not directly reflect a legal protection of minority shareholders. It is 
recognised that a perfect legal protection to minority interests according to the principles 
of good corporate governance was still hard to apply in Indonesia (Priyatna, 2012). 
2.3 Family ownership and firm value 
A number of studies have shown that the market appreciates firms with family ownership 
(Barontino and Caprio, 2005; Villalonga and Amit, 2006; Anderson and Reeb, 2003; 
Ying and Peng, 2010; Maury, 2006). The results of these studies demonstrated that 
family ownership structure is positively associated with increased firm value. But 
Anderson and Reeb (2003) noted that it is occurred, especially in countries that have 
well-established economic regulation. In countries with a low level of transparency, the 
presence of family ownership actually cause expropriation risk to minority shareholders. 
Furthermore, Maury (2006) warns that in countries with a low level of transparency, 
increased profitability can not be transferred into higher firm value. 
Leemon and Lins (2001) revealed that companies’ Tobins’ Q in Asia where 
expropriation against minority shareholders exist, has declined an average of more than 
12% compared to other companies. Meanwhile Claessens et al. (2000) stated that high 
expropriation occurred in countries such as Indonesia, the Philippines and Thailand, 
while in the countries of Malaysia, Singapore and Taiwan, there was evidence of 
expropriation. As it is known, Malaysia, Singapore and Taiwan have a higher level of 
investor protection than Indonesia, Philippines and Thailand. 
There are two approaches used to explain the possible behaviour chosen by the 
controlling shareholder (Siregar, 2007) which is a positive incentive effect (PIE) and 
negative entrenchment effect (NEE). Although both of these approaches are built by 
assuming the presence of excess control rights, i.e., the difference between control rights 
and rights to dividends (Jensen and Meckling, 1979; Shleifer and Vishny, 1997), but still 
relevant to be used to explain the possible behaviour of family ownership as the main 
holder of control. PIE assumed that controlling shareholder has an incentive and huge 
capacity to observe management intensively, thereby increasing the company’s value and 
lower the cost of equity. The dominant ownership in certain groups improve efficiency 
when large blockholder have a greater incentive to effectively monitor managers 
(Shleifer and Vishny, 1986). 
On the other hand, NEE argue that controlling shareholders will take advantage of its 
large capacity to undertake actions for personal gain at the expense of minority 
shareholders. Large shareholder can impact negatively on the value of the company, 
because they misused his position at the expense of minority shareholders (Stiglitz, 1985; 
Silanes et al., 1999). It refers to a fundamental problem in the agency theory, where there 
is conflict of interest between outside investors and controlling shareholders who have 
complete control of the manager (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). 
With due respect to the results of previous studies that proved market appreciates 
family ownership (Barontino and Caprio, 2005; Villalonga and Amit, 2006; Anderson 
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and Reeb, 2003; Ying and Peng, 2010; Maury, 2006), however this study to prove 
different side of the existence of family ownership based on the context of Indonesia. 
This research uses NEE argumentation to build hypothesis. NEE, assumed that 
companies in which legal control held by family will use their authority to maximise their 
own interest at the expense of outside investor, in line to Shleifer and Vishny (1997) that 
ownership by a tight family creates agency problems between majority shareholders and 
minority shareholders. The acts of majority to maximise their own interest at the expense 
of minority will be negatively responded by investor, due to higher risk expropriation in 
such firms. Then, the higher risk profile of family ownership perceived by investor will 
decrease firm value. Thus the presence of family ownership negatively associated with 
firm value. 
In the context of Indonesia, there are a number of factors that support that family 
ownership will be perceived negatively by investors, thus lowering the value of the 
company, firstly, the low level of investor protection in Indonesia (Priyatna, 2012; Jiang 
and Peng, 2011), in such condition, the likelihood of the majority shareholder to 
expropriate minority is very large. Second, according to Anderson and Reeb (2003), 
Maury (2007) and Jiang and Peng (2011), ownership concentration is only effective to 
the countries that have established rule of law and being counter-productive for  
un-transparence countries, otherwise decreasing firm value. The results of some of the 
previous research, Claessens et al. (2000) and Darmadi (2012) supported that Indonesia 
as a country with high level of expropriation. Therefore, the low law enforcement in 
Indonesia provides a conducive condition for family ownership to expropriate minority 
interest. Lemmon and Lins (2000) also uncovered that companies Tobis’ Q in Asia, 
where expropriation to the minority exist, have experienced a decreasing of firm value as 
of 12% and above, compared wit the other. This will be perceived negatively by 
investors, thereby reducing the value of the company. Thus the presence of family 
ownership negatively associated with firm value. Based on the NEE arguments, then the 
hypothesis of this study is: 
H1 Family ownership has a negative impact on firm value. 
2.4 Control variables 
In many studies, the determinant of firm value other than the ownership structure, is the 
financial performance, company profiles associated with firm size, market share and firm 
age (Black et al., 2006, 2013; Baek et al., 2004). Black et al. (2006) employed a number 
of control variables such as market share, leverage and growth as the important 
determinant of firm value. Wide market share indicates high potential profitability. 
However, this study uses the changes in operating profit, as a control variable, not market 
share, since operating earnings more represent the real performance of companies than 
market share. Companies whose profits increased from time to time will be more 
attractive and positively appreciated by investors. Another control variable is the 
leverage. High leverage represents a high risk enterprise. Companies with high leverage 
will be negatively associated with firm value. 
Growing companies will be more interesting to investors, some previous studies 
support a positive association between growth and firm value. Contrarily to prior studies 
that used research and development (R&D) as a proxy of growth (Vilalonga and Amit, 
2006; Black et al., 2006, 2013), this study chooses sales as a proxy of growth, because 
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sales better describe the actual growth experienced by the company and not just the 
potential for growth. 
3 Research methodology 
3.1 Model analysis 
This study uses regression analysis to examine proposed hypothesis. Regression model is 
stated as below: 
it 0 1 it 2 it 3 it 4 it itTQ  FAMONR  LOBD  LEV SGROWTH  ε= β + β + β + β +β +  (1) 
TQit firm value of company I at period t 
β0β1β2β3β4 regression coefficient 
FAMONRit family ownership of firm I at period t 
LOBDit change of operating income of company I at period t 
LEVit debt to equity ratio of company I at period t 
SGROWTHit growth of company I at period t 
εit error term. 
3.2 Operational variables  
Variables Operational definition Scale 
1 Firm value 
(TQ) 
Is the value of the business as an ongoing enterprise. Firm value 
is measured by Tobin’s Q, as follow: 
(Total assets Book value of equity) Market value of equity
Book value of total assets
− +  
Ratio 
2 Family 
ownership 
(FAMONR) 
Company in which one or more family members act as a chief 
executive or are in a board of directors and as the majority 
shareholder (Vilalonga and Amit, 2006). Majority shareholder 
limitation percentage is 10%, referring to Siregar (2007), 
Claessens (2000) and La Porta (1999), that the 10% ownership 
level has been quite effective in controlling the company. 
Companies that meet the above criteria where family members 
act as the director/board of directors and have a share of at least 
10%, given the numbers 1 and 0 otherwise. 
Nominal 
3 Changes in 
operating 
income 
(LBOD) 
Operating income is income from the company’s main activity 
which obtained by subtracting operating income to operating 
expenses. The formula changes in operating income is as follow: 
t 1 t
t 1
Operating profit Operating profit
Operating profit
−
−
+  
Then, companies that have positive earnings change, given the 
numbers 1 and 0 otherwise. 
Nominal 
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Variables Operational definition Scale 
4 Debt to equity 
ratio (LEV) 
Proportion of equity that comes from debt. 
Total debt
Total equity
 
Ratio 
5 Growth 
(SGROWTH) 
The potential increased of the company to the next, is measured 
by the growth of sales: 
t 1
t 1
Net sales Net sales
Net sales
−
−
+  
 
3.3 Sample 
Data was obtained from annual reports published in the website Indonesia Stock 
Exchange (IDX) and the respective company websites, for companies whose annual 
report data is not found on IDX sites, whereas the database shareholder obtained from the 
OSIRIS. This study uses all large cap companies (big capitalisation) in 2008, 2009, 2010 
and 2011 based on Fact Book documents published by the Stock Exchange in the years. 
The selection of companies with large market capitalisation, referring to Anderson and 
Reeb (2003), Villalonga and Amit (2006) and Jiang and Peng (2011), which uses large 
companies in their research, in addition, large firms are also more concern to investors 
and analysts than small companies (Chen and Jian, 2006). Data qualified as sample are as 
many as 146 observations, which obtained from the following process: 
The number of companies entering the big 
   200
group of capitalisation in 2008 – 2011
Companies that do not have complete data
   (54)
needed for the study.
The number of qualified samples to be processed      146
 
The data were processed with the aid of SPSS software version 19. 
4 Results and discussion 
The first classical assumption test on 146 observations, did not meet the four classical 
assumptions. The test results showed a number of data normality were identified as 
extreme data (outliers), a total of 37 observations were identified outliers are removed 
from observation and repeated testing. After dropping all outliers data, the second test 
against the 105 observations, shows the data meet the assumptions as indicated by 
multicollinearity VIF of each variable under 10 (Appendix 1). There is no autocorrelation 
can be seen from the residual value of Durbin Watson for 1.289 is higher than the value 
of α is set at 0.05 (Appendix 2). The model has also been free of heteroscedasticity, 
which can be seen from Spearman unstandardised residual values for all variables were 
above the α = 0.05 level (Appendix 3). 
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However, the data still can not fully meet the assumptions of normality (Appendix 4). 
One cause of the data does not meet the normal distribution because there are several 
variables like FAMONR and LBOD as a dummy variable with a value of 0 and 1, so it 
can not meet the required normality. However, because the number of observations is 
large enough (> 30), then theoretically meet the normal distribution of data, other than 
that based on the data plot (box-plot) the data have shown a normal distribution, and the 
value of R2 and numbers suitability model (F-test) have shown an increase in compared 
with the values of these parameters on the initial test. 
Profile of 105 observations that have met the classical assumption test and descriptive 
statistics are presented in Table 1. Panel A shows the sample by industry which 
dominated by a financial sector that is equal to 26% of the entire sample, and followed by 
the mining sector as much as 25%. Although the proportion is uneven, almost all industry 
groups are represented except property sector, real estate and building. The number of 
observations is also fairly distributed between the family and non-family ownership. 
Panel B displays a general descriptive statistics for each variable. Regression analysis 
was performed on 96 valid observations, because some variables are not available in full 
at 105 corresponding number of observations. The results of descriptive statistic is 
presented in Table 1, panel B. 
The model summary (Table 2), suggesting a correlation (R) are high among all 
predictor variables (FAMONR, LOBD, LEV, SGROWTH) with the response variable 
(TQ) of 0.539. Furthermore, the regression model also showed the adjusted R2 is quite 
high at 25.9% 0.259, it means that the changes of TQ variable can be explained by the 
four predictor variables together. Goodness regression model to the data can be seen from 
the F value of 9.296 and significant at α = 0.01, respectively. 
Testing the main hypothesis of this study (Table 2), shows that FAMONR 
significantly negative effect on the value of the company, at the 10% significance level. It 
is proven that firms with family ownership is perceived negatively by the market, this 
result once again consistent with the results of the research of Jiang and Peng (2011), 
Lemmon and Lins (2001) and Claessens et al. (2000), which found that Indonesia is one 
of countries with the high-level expropriation where family ownership is negatively 
related to performance. The majority shareholder entrenchment cause negative effects, 
which utilises a large capacity to undertake actions for personal gain at the expense of the 
minority shareholders. This behaviour is possible since the level of investor protection in 
Indonesia is still very weak (Priyatna, 2012; Jiang and Peng, 2011). 
The dominance of family ownership in large-scale enterprises to be inefficient, as 
investors are aware of the increased risk of expropriation on these companies which 
resulted in a decrease in the firm value. The movement of large companies more closely 
followed by investors than small firms (Chen and Jian, 2006). Therefore investors are 
more sensitive to any possible risks as a result of actions taken by large-scale enterprises, 
and quickly anticipate such risks in the valuation of the company. These findings, 
although still preliminary and still need to be further tested its consistency, successfully 
wrecked the opinion of Demsetz and Lehn (1985), Himmelberg et al. (1999) and 
Demsetz and Villonga (2001), that the ownership structure is not related to performance 
and merely the results of the current shareholders’ decision to maximise profits. 
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Control variables prove to affect the value of the company, namely the LBOD  
and LEV. High operating profit performance is perceived positively by investors, 
significant at α = 0.01. The companies with good earnings performance show positively 
associated with firm value. In contrast, firms with high leverage indicates a high risk and 
perceived negatively by investors resulting in a decline in the value of the company, 
supported by the results of the test that the coefficient is significant at α = LEV 0.001. 
Meanwhile, growth which proxied by sales, proved not significantly affect the value of 
the company. 
Table 1 Sample profile 
Panel A. Industrial sectors and ownership structure 
Industrial sector   
 Agriculture 11 10% 
 Mining 25 24% 
 Basic Industries 13 12% 
 Others 3 3% 
 Consumer goods 9 9% 
 Infrastructure, utilities and transportation 12 11% 
 Finance 26 25% 
 Investment 6 6% 
  105 100% 
Ownership structure   
 Family 50 48% 
 Non-family 55 52% 
  105 100% 
Panel B. Descriptive statistic 
 N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. deviation 
TQ 104 0.49 7.82 2.1463 1.4223 
FAMONR 105 0 1 0.48 0.502 
LBOD 101 0 1 0.69 0.464 
LEV 105 0.22 12.05 2.9558 3.3471 
SGROWTH 97 –0.21 1.03 0.2164 0.2341 
Valid N (listwise) 96     
Notes: TQ = (total asset-book value of equity) + market value of equity scaled by book 
value of assets; FAMONR = dummy variable of family ownership structure,  
1 = if family’s member is assigned as a Chairman/CEO and has at least 10% of 
family ownership, 0 otherwise; LBOD = dummy variable of change in operating 
income, 1 if positive change and 0 otherwise;  LEV = total debt to total equity; 
SGROWTH = changes in net sales. 
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Table 2 Estimation model 
Regression model estimation 
it 0 1 it 2 it 3 it 4 it itTQ  FAMONR  LOBD  LEV SGROWTH  ε= β + β + β + β +β +  
Variable Predicted sign ( + /–) Coefficient t-statistic Sig 
(Constant)  2.476 9.090 .000 
FAMONR – –.465 –1.741 .085* 
LBOD  +  1.041 3.425 .001*** 
LEV – –.209 –4.738 .000*** 
SGROWTH  +  –.986 –1.571 .120 
R .539 
Adjusted R2 .259 
F-stat 9.296*** 
Notes: ***, *Each significant, at the level 0.01 and 0.1, 
TQ = (total asset – book value of equity) + market value of equity scaled by book 
value of assets; FAMONR = dummy variable of family ownership structure,  
1 = if family’s member is assigned as a Chairman/CEO and has at least 10% of 
family ownership, 0 otherwise; LBOD = dummy variable of change in operating 
income, 1 if positive change and 0 otherwise;  LEV = total debt to total equity; 
SGROWTH = changes in net sales. 
5 Conclusions, implication and limitation 
This study aims to determine the impact of family ownership on firm value in the context 
of Indonesia, where the level of investor protection is weak and corrupt, and to confirm 
the results of research of Jiang and Peng (2011), in particular the results of research that 
in Indonesia, the presence of family ownership negatively affect performance. A number 
of control variables are used to examine the determinants of the firm value in addition to 
the family ownership structure. Control variables used in this study is the change in 
operating income, which represents the risk and leverage growth proxied by changes in 
sales. 
Research shows that family ownership structure negatively affect the firm value, at a 
significance level of 10%, consistent with Jiang and Peng (2011), Lemmon and Lins 
(2001) and Claessens et al. (2000), which found that Indonesia was a country with a high 
level of expropriation where family ownership was negatively related to performance. 
The majority shareholder entrenchment cause negative effects, which utilises a large 
capacity to undertake actions for personal gain at the expense of minority shareholders. In 
addition it is evident that the change in operating profit significantly positive effect on 
firm value, whereas negatively affect leverage on firm value, respectively at a 
significance level 1%. While the growth of the company which is proxied by changes in 
sales, not shown to affect the value of the company. 
However, this study does not exercise control over the level of investor protection as 
done by Gompers et al. (2003), which uses antitakeover index (GIndex) which is based 
on entrenchment index (EIndex) by Bebchuk et al. (2009). This study only assume the 
level of protection against expropriation of investors or existing investors based on the 
results of previous studies. Future research should incorporate control variables investor 
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protection index, in order to obtain more accurate results. Besides, future research could 
compare with companies that do not include a large company, to gain a broader 
generalisation of the results of the study. Measurement of family ownership structure can 
be traced by using the ultimate ownership as done by Siregar (2007), not only by 
ownership immediate as done in this study. 
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Appendix 1 
Multicollinearity test  
Coefficientsa 
Model 
Unstandardise
d coefficients 
 
Standardise 
coefficients 
t Sig. 
Collinearity statistics 
B Std. error Beta Tolerance VIF 
1 (Constant) 2.476 .272   9.090 .000   
 FAMONR –.465 .267  –.158 –1.741 .085 .944 1.059 
 LBOD 1.041 .304  .332 3.425 .001 .831 1.203 
 LEV –.209 .044  –.419 –4.738 .000 .997 1.003 
 SGROWTH –.986 .627  –.154 –1.571 .120 .816 1.225 
Note: aDependent variable: TQ 
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Appendix 2 
Autocorrelation test 
 R R square Adjusted R square 
Std. error of the 
estimate Durbin-Watson 
1 .539a .290 .259 1.26929 1.289 
Notes: aPredictors: (Constant), SGROWTH, LEV, FAMONR, LBOD 
Appendix 3 
Heteroschedasticity test 
Correlations 
 FAMONR LBOD LEV SGROWTH Unstandardised residual 
Spearman’s 
rho 
FAMONR Correlation 
coefficient 
1.000 .187 .099 .169 –.004 
Sig. 
(2-tailed) 
. .062 .316 .098 .971 
N 105 101 105 97 96 
LBOD Correlation 
coefficient 
.187 1.000 –.071 .435** .013 
Sig. 
(2-tailed) 
.062 . .482 .000 .898 
N 101 101 101 97 96 
LEV Correlation 
coefficient 
.099 –.071 1.000 .153 –.007 
Sig. 
(2-tailed) 
.316 .482 . .136 .947 
N 105 101 105 97 96 
SGROWTH Correlation 
coefficient 
.169 .435** .153 1.000 .069 
Sig. 
(2-tailed) 
.098 .000 .136 . .505 
N 97 97 97 97 96 
Unstandardised 
residual 
Correlation 
coefficient 
–.004 .013 –.007 .069 1.000 
Sig. 
(2-tailed) 
.971 .898 .947 .505 . 
N 96 96 96 96 96 
Note: **Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
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Appendix 4 
Normality test 
One-Sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov test 
 FAMONR LBOD LEV SGROWTH Standardised residual 
N 105 101 105 97 96 
Norma 
parametersa,b 
Mean .48 .69 2.9858 .2164 .0000000 
Std. deviation .502 .464 3.34707 .23407 .97872097 
Most extreme 
differences 
Absolute .352 .439 .279 .133 .150 
Positive .352 .254 .279 .133 .150 
Negative –.328 –.439 –.204 –.053 –.090 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov Z 3.612 4.413 2.863 1.305 1.471 
Asymp. sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000 .000 .066 .026 
Notes: aTest distribution is normal. 
bCalculated from data. 
